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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0\VYliEE, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintif!J garnishee plaintiff 
and appellantJ 
vs. 
ROBBINS lVIARCO POLO, aka and 
dba ROBBINS MARIC-0-POLO, a 
corporation, and ROBBINS TRAV-
EL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
corporation, 
Dcfclldants and judgment debtorsJ 
vs. 
DVVIGI-IT G. LUlVIAN, 
Garnishee defendant and 
respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
STATEniENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10162 
This is a garnishee action by plaintiff, garnishee 
plaintiff and appellant (hereinafter called plaintiff) 
against garnishee defendant and respondent (herein-
5 
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after called defendant) based upon an alleged debt 
from defendant to judgment debtor Robbins Travel 
International, Inc. (hereinafter called Robbins, Inc.) 
arising out of assertedly illegal payment by Robbins, 
Inc. to defendant pursuant to a corporate note given 
defendant allegedly in the purchase of stock in Robbins, 
Inc. owned by defendant. The Trial Court, sitting with-
out a jury, entered a decree dismissing the action (R. 
18). On appeal, plaintiff prays that this Court reverse 
such decree and remand this case to the Trial Court 
with the direction to enter judgment against defendant 
and in favor of plaintiff in the sum of the judgment 
debt owing by Robbins, Inc. to plaintiff (R. 1), but 
not to exceed $1,900.00 (R. 5-6; Tr. 3). 
The Trial Court likely did not "find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon," as required by URCP 52 (a). Rather, it char-
acterized its memorandum decision (R. 16-17) as con-
stituting such findings and conclusions ( R. 18). In that 
the transcript is relatively brief and, moreover, because 
the pertinent objective facts are without dispute, the 
methodology adopted does not impede consideration of 
the salient issues. Such facts follow. 
In February or March, 1960, defendant entered 
into a transaction with Robbins, Inc. through its presi-
dent, Allen B. Robbins (Tr. 3-4, 16). The arrangement 
agreed upon was that defendant "would put money 
into Robbins Travel and would come in as an owner 
and as an officer" (Tr. 17). His ownership was to be 
6 
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()f a gi\·en percent of the ~orporation - Mr. Robbins 
kstitied ~0'/0 and defendant recalled 48% (Tr. 5, 19), 
in cxehange for $-1,000.00 paid in (Tr. 20). It was also 
agreed that defendant would become a director (Tr. 
:W) .. At or about the time defendant came into the 
corporation and became an officer, vice-president, he 
did in fact pay in the $4,000.00 which was placed in a 
corporate account (Tr. 5, 7, 19-20). Mr. Robbins testi-
fied that defendant became a director, but defendant 
said that he never participated "in any kind of director 
aetiYities" ( Tr. 5, 20). A stock certificate was never 
delivered defendant for whatever number of shares the 
agreed percentage represented (Tr. 12-14, 17-18). 
By April, 1960, the relationship between defendant 
and Robbins, Inc.'s president - Mr. Robbins - had 
becmne inan1icable. According to defendant: 
"I wanted out of the corporation. I wanted my 
nwney out, and I wanted to terminate my em-
ployn1ent there. This was agreeable with Mr. 
Robbins. As he has mentioned he was dissatisfied 
with n1y efforts and by mutual consent we agreed 
that I would leave." (Tr. 18). 
:\Ir. Robbins' testimony was substantially identical (Tr. 
10, 13, 15). 
It was agreed that defendant would withdraw from 
Robbins, Inc. (Tr. 10, 13, 15, 18). On April 11, 1960, 
"Jir. Robbins delivered to defendant a promissory note 
for the n1oney he had put into the corporation, executed 
both by the corporation and personally (R. 11; Tr. 8-10, 
13). 
7 
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Payments of at least $1,900.00 were made prior to 
May 11, 1961, to defendant by Robbins, Inc. (Tr. 11-12, 
18-19; Ex. D-1). The corporation was insolvent at the 
times of such payments, i.e. its liabilities exceeded its 
assets ( Tr. 12). 
Plaintiff's judgment against Robbins, Inc. (R. I) 
was based upon an indebtedness incurred subsequent to 
such payments (Tr. 14). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRANSACTIONS HERE INVOLVED 
CONSTITUTED: (A) A SALE OF STOCK BY 
ROBBINS, INC. TO DEFENDANT; AND, 
LATER AND SEPARATELY, (B) A PUR-
CHASE OF SUCH STOCK FROM DEFEND-
ANT BY ROBBINS, INC. 
Plaintiff characterizes as stock transactions both 
the agreement of February or March, 1960, by which 
defendant "put money into Robbins Travel and would 
come in as an owner" ( Tr~ 17) and the later agreement 
of April, 1960 satisfying defendant's desire to be "out 
of the corporation. I wanted my money out, and I 
wanted to terminate my employment there" (Tr. 18). 
Defendant disputes this denomination (R. 9). The Trial 
Court expressly refused to rule upon the character of 
the two transactions, stating: "This Court is not going 
to determine that this was a stock transaction or a loan 
transaction . . . " ( R. 17) . 
8 
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A. 
'i'hc init·ial agreement of Febnwry or March~ 1960, 
and JHI/Jmcnt lJ.tf defendant thereunder~ constituted de-
fendant a stockholder in Robbins~ Inc. 
'rhere is no question that an integral part of the 
i11itial agreen1ent between Robbins, Inc. and defendant 
was that the latter would become a part owner of the 
corporation. This was the testimony of Mr. Robbins, 
who handled the transaction for Robbins, Inc. (Tr. 5). 
:\lore i1nportant, the defendant himself so stated (Tr. 
17, 19). Although the two participants differed as to 
the percentage of ownership to be held by defendant, 
they concurred that defendant was to acquire such a 
percentage (Tr. ·5, 19). It is further undisputed that-
pursuant to such agree1nent and well in advance of the 
later agreement of April, 1960 - defendant did pay 
the $4,000.00 specified by the agreement into the corpo-
ration, and that it was placed in the corporation account 
(Tr. 5, 7, 19-20). 
Based upon this recitation, it is patent that the 
agreement Yi'as not for defendant to make a $4,000.00 
.. loan" to the corporation, and that the $4,000.00 in fact 
paid in pursuant to such agreement did not constitute 
a "loan." Quite the contrary. According to defendant's 
own testi1nony ( Tr. 17, 19) , he became a part owner, 
not a creditor, of Robbins, Inc. through his payment.! 
1 On cross-examination,_ Mr. Ro~?ins. denied that the $4,0000.00 
was a loan (Tr. 14). Neither on mrec"L nor on cross did defendant 
so describe it. As noted, he in fact affirmatively indicated his 
ownership capacity (Tr. 17, 19). 
9 
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It is elementary that acquisition of stock is the 
means by which one gains part "ownership" of a corpo-
ration I6-2-5 (7) UCA, I953 2 ; I3 Am. Jur.~ Corpora-
tions § I72. In consequence, the agreement was clearly 
for defendant to obtain a stock right, and defendant's 
testimony corroborates Mr. Robbins' more explicit reci-
tation (Tr. 5) to that effect. 
It is, of course, undisputed that defendant did not 
receive a stock certificate from Robbins, Inc. evidencing 
his stock interest (Tr. I2-I4, 17-I8). But "it is well 
settled that a certificate of stock in a corporation is not 
the stock itself," II Fletcher~ Cyc. Corps.§ 5092 at p .75; 
Robey v. Hardy~ 63 Utah 23I, 224 Pac. 889,892 (I924). 
Thus, the failure to deliver a stock certificate to defend-
ant is immaterial. There is an absence of evidence of any 
demand for such delivery. In fact, Mr. Robbins' testi-
mony was that- undoubtedly in the pattern of many 
closely held corporations - '' (n) o certificates were 
issued to anybody" (Tr. I4). The record reflects, there-
fore, that, although defendant concededly had received 
no stock certificate~ he maintained - by reason of his 
initial agreement - a stock right. 
Review of pertinent authorities demonstrates that 
the most significant factor among those undisputed is-
far from the nondelivery of the stock certificate- the 
payment of the agreed consideration, $4,000.00, by the 
defendant into the corporation at or about the time of 
2 At all times pertinent to this action, the Utah Business Corpo-
ration Act, effective January 1, 1962, was inapplicable. In con-
sequence, citations throughout are to Title 16, Chapter 2 UCA, 
1953, then effective. 
10 
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the initial agreeinent (Tr. ID-~0). For~ by such pay-
ment, the contract became nonc,rccutory~ defendanfs 
sloe/,· ri!Jhf 1'csted, and he became- at law - a stock-
/wider in Huhbins, Inc. As stated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Stech· 'l'. [(ramlich, 52 Idaho 156, 12 P.2d 260, 
:W~ (1932): 
"\ Vhen stock is paid for, it is in fact issued, 
irrespective of the issuance of the certificate which 
is nothing more nor less than evidence of the 
stockholder's ownership." 
In accord is Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Gunderson~ 
106 F.~d 633 ( 8 Cir., 1939). 
'Yhen, therefore, defendant paid in the $4,000.00 
he becmne a stockholder. In this capacity, he had no 
further obligations toward the corporation. Its obliga-
tion was to hi1n as its stockholder. 
~'his Court has recognized the principles here enun-
ciated. It has held that, once the stock agreed upon is 
paid for, the obligee becomes a stockholder and- upon 
eorporate failure following demand to deliver an appro-
priate certificate - he Inay, at his option, either sue 
the corporation at law for the conversion of the stock 
or in equity for the delivery of such certificate, Robey 
l'. Hardy, supra at 224 Pac. 892; Coray v. Perry Inv. 
Co., 50 Utah 70, 166 Pac. 672 (1917). 
Prior to the second agreement, that of April, 1960, 
defendant's relationship with Robbins, Inc. had ripened 
into that of a stockholder. At any time prior to entrv 
into that later agreement, he could have - following 
11 
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demand- compelled issuance of a certificate as evidence 
thereof. His stock position was clear. 
B. 
The second agreement of April, 1960, was one for 
purchase by Robbins_, Inc. of defendant-'s stockholder 
interest in the purchasing corporation. 
Given defendant's status as a corporate stockholder 
prior to the agreement of April, 1960, there is no ques-
tion that such second agreement constituted a repurchase 
by the corporation of such stock interest. Defendant 
testified that the effect of the agreement was to take 
him "out of the corporation" and to get his "money out" 
(Tr. 18), and Mr. Robbins' testimony was to the same 
effect (Tr. 10, 13, 15). A divestiture of defendant's 
interest in the corporation, i.e. his interest as a stock-
holder, necessarily required a sale of his stock ( Tr. II) . 
It is clear, further, that the sale from defendant 
was to - and the purchase by - Robbins, Inc. Al-
though Mr. Robbins co-signed the note as an individual, 
it is undisputed that the $I,900.00 with which we are 
here concerned was paid by the corporation out of its 
corporate account (Tr. 12-I3) .3 
a The fact that defendant's status as a corporate employee termi-
nated at or about the time of the agreement to purchase his stock 
interest has no bearing on the transaction. There being no evi-
dence that his employment was for a term, the presumption is 
that it was terminable at will, Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Annos. 11 A.L.R. 
740, 100 A.L.R. 835, 161 A.L.R. 709; 35 Am. Jur., Master and 
Servant, ~19 at pp. 457-58. It could, thus, have been terminated 
by either party independent of the purchase of defendant's 
stock, there being no representation by either defendant or Mr. 
Robbins that the initial agreement of February or March, 1960 
made defendant's status as an employee legally dependent upon 
his status as a stockholder, or vice-versa. 
12 
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It should he n1entioned in passing that, taken in the 
light of the objective facts and the applicable law, the 
clieitation upon cross examination of Mr. Robbins of 
the conclusion that "actually the original agreement was 
modified by a later agreement" ( Tr. 15) ) may mislead. 
The agreernent of April, 1960 patently was not the con-
clusion of a series of continuing negotiations between 
the parties initiated in February or March of that year. 
There were, rather, two separate agreements. Rights 
under the initial agreement had vested prior to entry 
into the second agreement, i.e. the one for purchase by 
Robbins, Inc. of its own stock. The only manner in which 
the later agreement, if legal~ modified the former was 
through changing the status of the parties created and 
n·sted under the prior contract . 
. A_ case remarkably similar on its facts to the instant 
controYcrsy, and one which is in accord with the con-
cepts presented both under subdivisions A and B of this 
Point, is 1Jlindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions~ 132 
Cal. .App. 2d 598, 282 P.2d 1024 (1955). The initial 
agreement, dated March 8, 1948, was that Mindenberg 
"(p) ending the issuance of stock," "shall have a present 
18\t (1o interest in and to all the assets of said corpora-
tion." Thereafter, on April 30, 1948, Mindenberg and 
the corporation entered into a second, and separate ( al-
beit it Inodified the status created by the first), contract 
whereby Jiindenberg- in consideration of $26,250.00 
payable in installments from the corporation - did 
.. assign, transfer, set over, deliver, acquit and release 
to Cannel Film Productions, Inc., all of my right, title 
13 
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and interest therein, whether represented by stock or 
arising out of that certain 'Memorandum of Agreement' 
between the parties hereto dated March 8, 1948." In 
the suit, one by Mindenberg to recover unpaid install-
ments, the corporation defended upon the ground that 
the second agreement was illegal as specifying an un-
permissable purchase by it of its own stock. Mindenberg 
countered by asserting, as does the defendant here, that 
he had never been issued stock certificates for the 18%%, 
and that there was no sale or purchase of corporate stock. 
The trial court so held, but the Court of Appeals re-
versed, stating at 282 P.2d 1031 that the lower court's 
holding: 
" (I) gnores the legal effect of the agreement 
for 'a present 18%,% interest in and to all of 
the assets of said corporation ... ' The issuance 
of the certificate was not essential to plaintiff 
becoming a shareholder ... 'Capital stock' means, 
'not the shares of which the nominal capital is 
composed, but the actual capital- i.e. assets-
with which the corporation carries on its corpor-
ate business' ... The sale of plaintiff's 18%% 
interest was a sale of stock." (Citations elimi-
nated.) 
The Court of Appeals then held that Mindenberg had 
failed to sustain his burden of proving that the payment 
for the corporation's own stock under the subsequent 
agreement would be out of surplus, rather than out of 
capital, as required by California law, and therefore 
reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff. 
In the instant case, as in Mindenberg: (I) defend-
14 
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ant's percentage holding constituted a holding of stock, 
crt.' II in the absence of the delivery of a stock certificate; 
and (~) defendant's and Robbins, Inc.'s mutual agree-
ment that defendant return his interest in consider-
ation of the corporation's installment payments consti-
tutnl a purchase by such corporation of its own stock. 
It shall now be demonstrated that here, as in Min-
dcnberg, the purchase by Robbins, Inc. from defendant 
was illegal. 
POINT II 
TI-IE $1,900 PAID TO DEFENDANT BY 
ROBBINS, INC. VV AS MADE IN THE IL-
LEGAL AND VOID PURCHASE OF ITS 
0\VN STOCK. 
A. 
Tlu: general n~;le in Utah is that a purchase by a 
corporation of its own stock is illegal and void. 
The Utah rule on this subject was established by 
Pace v. Pace Bros.~ 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1 (1936), reh. 
den.~ 91 Ctah 149, 63 P.2d 590 (1936). The decision, 
neither rnodified nor reversed by subsequent judicial pro-
nouncenlent, in effect adopted the English common law 
rule that a corporation may not - absent certain judi-
cially engrafted exceptions or express statutory author-
ity -purchase its uwn stock, and that any such pur-
ported purchase is void, Trevor v. Whitworth~ 12 App. 
15 
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Cas. 409 (1887). The holding was premised upon the 
public policy enunciated by 103-12-4 ( 2) Rev. St., 1933, 
a penal statute, which rendered it a misdemeanor for 
any corporate director: 
"To divide, withdraw or in any manner, except 
as provided by law, pay to the stockholders, or 
any of them, any part of the capital of the cor-
poration.'' 
On petition for rehearing, this Court further ex-
tended the holding to prohibit such purchases out of 
"surplus," i.e. restricted permissible payments to stock-
holders to dividends, unless otherwise provided by the 
aforementioned judicial exceptions or statutory author-
ity, id.~ 63 P.2d 591. 
In consequence, at the behest of intervening judg-
ment creditors of the corporation,4 the former stock-
holder was prohibited from enforcing notes and mort-
gages given him in exchange for corporate stock. 
This Court in Pace placed heavy reliance upon the 
damage done to creditors- prior, present or future-
through the dissipation of capital inherent in a purchase 
by a corporation of its own stock, stating at 59 P.2d 5: 
"It may be remarked that it would give little 
comfort to a creditor if he found all the assets 
gone but the treasury full of the corporation's 
own stock certificates paid for by its assets." 
4 Whose credits and resulting judgments were subsequent to the 
notes and mortgages given plaintiff, Abstract of Record (State 
Library), pp. 7, 14, 32, 33. 
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This reasoning closely Inirrored that of Lord Herschell 
in his opinion in Trevor v. JVhitworth~ supra (decided 
upon st:rintin1 opinions), when he said that creditors: 
" ... have a right to rely, and were intended 
by the Legislature to have a right to rely, on the 
capital remaining undiminished by any expendi-
tures outside these limits, or by the return of any 
part of it to the shareholders." 
For con1prehensive authority additional to that cited in 
l'ace to the effect that treasury stock cannot be· con-
sidered a true asset of a corporation and that, by the very 
nature of the corporate structure, it cannot own any 
part of itself so that such a transaction is in reality a 
reduction of equity, see footnote 5, Fultz v. Anzac Oil 
Corp.} 240 F.2d 21, 22-23 ( 5 Cir., 1957). 
The statute upon which this Court in Pace predi-
cated the public policy against such a reduction of equity 
was equally effectual at all times here pertinent. 78-13-
4 (2) UCA, 1953 is identical to 103-12-4 (2) Rev. St. 
1933, except for certain provisions relative to preferred 
stock not here applicable (Tr. 12). Additionally, 18-2-
1 i Rev. St., 1933 -which this Court in Pace indicated 
would contribute weight to the public policy pronounced 
had it been in effect at the time of the transaction there 
considered, 59 P.2d 3 - was incorporated in 16-2-15 
lTC . ..-\ .. 1953. 
Therefore, unJlY;s otherwise "provided by law," the 
payments made by Robbins, Inc., to defendant pur-
suant to the stock purchase were illegal and void. 
17 
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B. 
The subject stock pu1'chase was not authorized by 
16-2-16 UC.A, 1953. 
By L. 1951, ch. 23, §2, the legislature specified 
certain conditions under which a corporation permis-
sively "may purchase or redeem one or more shares of 
any and all of its own capital stock," 16-2-16 DCA, 
1953. This constituted a "provision of law" which, when 
applicable, would justify a departure from the general 
rule enunciated in Pace~ Shumaker v. U etx Exploration 
Co.~ 157 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D. Utah, 1957). 
Two factors which reflect upon the scope and pur-
pose of the enactment require examination at the outset. 
First, as shall become apparent, 16-2-16 constituted 
both a codification of judicial exceptions recognized 
by Pace and a legislative creation of additional excep-
tions. Second, the Utah legislature did not follow the 
precedent of its California counterpart. Prior to 1929, 
based upon a similar penal statute, the rule adopted by 
Pace had applied in California and-in fact-this Court 
in Pace relied heavily upon California precedents, 59 
P.2d 3, 6-7. In that year, however, the California legis-
lature enacted a statute which gave positive authoriza-
tion to corporations, subject to certain specified excep-
tions, to purchase their own stock; for the legislative 
history, see Good1nan v. Global Industries~ 80 Cal. 
App. 2d 583, 182 P.2d 300 (1947). In Utah, to the 
contrary, there remained after 1951 a positive prohi-
18 
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bition against such purchases, subject only to the per-
missiYc exceptions specified. 
From the first factor, it is concluded that judicial 
precedent will prove-in some instances- helpful in 
interpretation of 16-2-16. From the second factor, it 
is concluded that Utah law derogates against corporate 
self-purchase unless it can be demonstrated that a 
given permissive condition exists. 
The latter conclusion is supported by the decision 
of this Court in White v. Western Empire Life Ins. 
Co., 11 Utah 2d 227, 357 P.2d 483, 484 (1960), in 
which the requirement of "substantial evidence" was 
specified to justify the finding of an exception. The 
White decision is cited by 6A. Fletcher Cyc. Corps. 
§2848 at p. 372 ( 1963 cum. supp. at p. 12) in support 
of the following statement: 
"However, even if the right to purchase its 
own stock is recognized, the right to purchase 
should be confined within strict limits . . . " 
'Vith this background, particular examination of 
the 16-2-16 exceptions in the context of the undisputed 
facts will be undertaken. The only two statutory seg-
ments which have conceivable applicability are subdi-
Yisions (a) and (f). The Trial Court relied upon both, 
finding: ( 1 ) '' (I) f this was a stock transaction it would 
appear to the Court that it is clearly exempt by Section 
16-2-16, Utah Code, 1953, Subsection (a)"; and (2) 
"(I)t clearly appears from the evidence that the finan-
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cial structure of Robbins Travel Corporation was not 
in any way affected by the transaction" (R. 16). 
Analysis will demonstrate that neither finding is 
supported by any evidence, let alone substantial evi-
dence, and that- in fact- the undisputed facts and 
applicable law impel the conclusion that neither per-
missive condition exists in this case. 
I. 
16-2-16(a) is inapplicable to this case. 
16-2-16(a) permits corporate purchase of its own 
stock " ( t) o collect or compromise, in good faith, a debt, 
claim or controversy with any shareholder." 
Although the Trial Court was less explicit than 
might be desired in expressing its reasons for finding 
condition (a) fulfilled, it would appear that the key 
is "controversy." This conclusion is reached by the pro-
cess of elimination. It is patent that there was, prior to 
the agreement of April, 1960 (which agreement was 
one, at law, by Robbins, Inc., to purchase its own 
stock), no "debt" or "claim" flowing from defendant 
to the corporation or vice-versa. Thus only the "con-
troversy" category remains. 
The only evidence bearing upon any "controversy" 
was that, following defendant's entry-as an owner and 
officer-into the affair of Robbins, Inc., Mr. Robbins 
grew dissatisfied with his efforts. They then decided 
mutually that defendant would get "out" of the cor-
20 
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poration. The J\ pril agreement ensued ( Tr. 13, 15, 
18). 
Consideration of condition (a) demonstrates that 
this type of "controversy" is not of the sort which ful-
fills the statutory requirement for a departure from the 
general rule prohibiting purchase by a corporation of 
its own stock. 
In the first place, the a controversy.>} testified to was 
not bef1.occn Robbins} Inc._, as an entity and the defend-
ant, but rather between Mr. Robbins and the defendant. 
To allow a dominant individual in a corporation to 
"compromise" his differences with a fellow stockholder 
through the corporate purchase of the other's stock-
and the consequent dissipation of the capital fund held 
for past, present and future creditors-would not only 
expand condition (a) beyond its apparent dictate that 
the "debt, clai1n or controversy" involve the corporation, 
but would run counter to the well-established policy 
of the law that capital stock shall not be purchased by 
the corporation to benefit any individual stockholder 
in an intra-corporate fuss. The re1nedy of the individual 
shareholder is J rather than a raidingn the corporate 
creditor's f'u.nd., to purchase for his own account and at 
his own expense the stock of the fellow shareholder with 
tchom he has a ucontroversyn. Both Lord Herschell and 
Lord ~Iacnaghten in Trevor v. Whitworth_, supra, dealt 
with the legality of a purchase by the corporation to 
remove dissenting stockholders . 
... -\.ccording to the former: 
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"I can quite understand that the directors of 
a company may sometimes desire that the stock-
holders should not be numerous, and that they 
should be persons likely to leave them with a 
free hand to carry on their operations. But I 
think it would be dangerous to countenance the 
view that, for reasons such as these, they could 
legitimately expend the moneys of the company 
to any extent they please in the purchase of its 
shares. No doubt if certain shareholders are dis-
posed to hamper the proceedings of the company, 
and are willing to sell their shares, they may be 
bought out; but this must be done by persons, 
existing shareholders or others, who can be in-
duced to purchase the shares, and not out of the 
funds of the company." 
Said the latter : 
"Who are the shareholders whose continuance 
in a company the company or its executives con-
sider undesirable? Why, shareholders who quar-
rel with the policy of the board, and wish to turn 
the directors out; shareholders who ask questions 
which it may not be convenient to answer; share-
holders who want information which the directors 
think it prudent to withhold. Can it be contended 
that when the policy of directors is assailed they 
may spend the capital of the company in keeping 
themselves in power, or in purchasing the retire-
ment of inquisitive and troublesome critics?" 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Supreme 
Court of Delaware has recently held officers of a cor-
poration liable for accounting to shareholders when 
they cause such corporation, for their own benefit, to 
purchase its own stock, even though corporate capital 
22 
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was not thereby iinpaired, Bennett v. Propp_, 187 A.2d 
-~Ot> (Del., 1962). 
Summarizing the first deficiency in the Trial Court's 
application of condition (a) : ( 1) no "controversy" of 
any type between defendant and the corporation was 
shown, which would justify Robbins, Inc.'s purchase of 
its own stock ; and ( 2) there is an established legal 
interdiction against "raids" on corporate capital to 
resolve intra-corporate business disputes-it is up to 
one disputant to buy out the other. 
Secondly, and equally determinative, a considera-
tion of accepted legal definition and a reading of C01f-
dition (a) in its entirety leads to the conclusion that, as 
used in the context, the word a controversy-'-' does not 
refer to any dispute-business, social or otherwise, but 
rather to justiciable disputes, ones which are subject to 
adjudication. This is so for three reasons. 
( 1) In its legal sense, the word "controversy" refers 
to justiciable controversies. Hence Black"s Law Diction-
ary (4th Ed), at p. 400 defines the word thusly: 
''Controversy - A litigated question; adver-
sary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action 
or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable 
dispute." 
.. As a legal term, the word "controversy", therefore, em-
bodies the concept of a dispute which has ripened into 
justiciability. 
( 2) The conclusion reached by a consideration of 
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the legal definition of the word "controversy" is further 
strengthened by an examination of the entire condition 
(a). In context, the word appears disjunctively, as 
follows: "debt, claim or controversy." Both "debt" and 
"claim" are easily identifiable as terms referring to 
justiciable disputes. Under the rule of interpretation, 
noscitur a sociis_, the meaning of a word is known from 
the words which accompany it. Had the legislature 
intended the word "controversy" to be applied to any 
dispute, whether justiciable or not, it would not have 
utilized the terms "debt" and "claim", for they would 
have been superfluous. It is inherent in the drafting of 
the disjunctive that the legislature desired to allow 
collection or compromise of any justiciable dispute. 
( 3) The conclusion that a justiciable dispute was 
contemplated is strengthened by an examination of 
established law at the time of the enactment of 16-
2-16. Both under the English rule and under the Pace 
decision, it was recognized that a corporation might 
receive its own stock to collect or compromise an out-
standing obligation, Pace v. Pace Bros._, supra at 59 
P.2d 3; Levy, "Purchase by an English Company of its 
own Shares", 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 45, 55-56 (1930). 
In this light, it appears likely that condition (a), at 
least, was a codification of common law, to be judged 
by common law standards. If so, it clearly applies only 
to justiciable disputes and excludes the settlement of 
non-justiciable disputes, particularly when they are 
between two shareholders and not between a shareholder 
and the corporation, see Levy, "Purchase by a Corpo-
24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ration of its own Stock", 15 1llinn. L. Rev. 1, 15, 31-32 
( HJ30). 
\ Vha tevcr controversy the record reveals as a 
precedent to the April agreement (by which the cor-
poration arranged to purchase its own stock) was be-
tween ~lr. Robbins and defendant, not between Rob-
bins, Inc., and defendant. It was, moreover, non-justi-
l'iabel. A business disagreement between shareholders, 
absent smne grounds for suit, is not a province of the 
courts. 
The Trial Court erred in finding condition (a) to 
be met. 
2. 
IH-:?-lt) (f) is inapplicable to this case. 
Condition (f) allows corporate self-purchase " ( i) n 
any case where the use of the funds or property of a 
corporation for such purchase or redemption would not 
cause the in1pairment of that portion of its assets ac-
quired as consideration for its shares .... " Its prime 
effect is to restrict the meaning given "capital" by Pace 
at 63 P.:?d 591. Following its enactment, purchase by 
a corporation of its own stock could be made out of 
surplus. The statutory definition of "capital" is in 
accord with the general contemporary concept, 18 
C.J.S., Corporations:> §193 (b) at p. 616. 
The eYidence regarding the financial condition at 
the ti1nes of payment of moneys received by defendant 
is undisputed. Robbins, Inc. was insolvent at all such 
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times. (Tr. 12). It had no surplus. The purchase vvas 
thus bound to impair5 the capital of the corporation, 
i.e. "that portion of its assets acquired as consideration 
for its shares." The financial structure of the corpora-
tion was obviously adversely affected, for $1,900.00 
in cash assets was paid to purchase treasury stock which 
as previously noted, could not properly be classed as 
an asset, Fultz v. Anzac, supra. 
In Cleveland v. Jencks Mfg. Co.~ 54 R.I. 218, 171 
Atl. 917,918 (1934), the Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
in considering a statute which-as ours-prohibits cor-
porate self-purchase resulting in impairment of capital, 
stated: 
"It is obvious that an insolvent corporation 
would not possess assets sufficent to purchase 
shares of its own stock without impairing assets." 
That is the precise situation which is here encountered. 
At the time of payments, the corporation was insolvent. 
And the time of payment controls. Wormser, "Cor-
poration's Power to Acquire its Stock", 24 Yale L.J. 
177, 186-87 (1915) discusses the situation where "the 
contract of purchase is made when the corporation is 
solvent, but the corporation becomes insolvent before 
payment is made on completed." Citing In the matter 
of Fechheimer Fischel Co.~ Bankrupt~ 212 Fed. 357 
(2d Cir., 1914), cert. den. 234 U.S. 760 (1914) the 
article concludes that the financial condition at the time 
s "To make worse; to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or 
strength; to deteriorate; damage; as, to impair health," Webster's 
New International Dictionary (2d Ed), p. 1246. 
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of payment, not at the ti1ne of contract, is the significant 
fad. In arl'ord is the more recent case of In re Matthews 
ConJJt. Co., 1~0 F. Supp. 818, 821 (S.D. Calif., 1954). 
The Trial Court's conclusion that "the financial 
structure of Robbins Travel Corporation was not in any 
wny affected" was clearly erroneous. The condition 
created by 16-2-16 (f) was not met. 
POINT III 
THE FACT THAT ROBBINS, INC.'S DEBT 
TO PLAINTIFF AROSE SUBSEQUENT TO 
ITS ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO DEFENDANT 
IS I~IMATERIAL. 
The Trial Court found that "the transaction be-
tween the Robbins Travel Corporation and the defend-
ant Lun1an took place long prior to the indebtedness 
of the Robbins Travel Corporation to the plaintiff" 
( R. 17) . The record is clear that both the stock purchase 
agreement of April, 1960, and the payments thereon 
took place at least a year prior to contraction of the 
indebtedness upon which plaintiff took judgment. (Tr. 
14). 
But of what importance is this? Pace v. Pace Bros.~ 
supra, settled LTtah law that a subsequent creditor may 
attack a previous unlawful sale of stock. The holding 
makes sense, for the illegal damage to the corporate 
structtu·e is as harmful to future as to present creditors. 
According to this Court at 59 P.2d 7: 
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"Future as well as present creditors should 
be able to rely on the implied representation that 
the corporation holds assets as represented by its 
outstanding stock." 
The Pace decision has not been modified or overruled 
in this regard, either by this Court or by the legislature. 
The attempt to impugn plaintiff's status by its being 
a future creditor is therefore nugatory. 
If payment for a corporation's own stock is illegal, 
it can recover from the payee, even though the contract 
of purchase is fully executed, for-although the parties 
are in pari delicto-the capital of the company has been 
pro-tanto reduced by the payments and public policy 
requires the intervention of the courts, 6A Fletcher Cyc. 
Corps. §2852 at pp. 388-89; see Murphy Wholesale 
Grocery Co. v. Skaggs~ 67 Utah 487, 248 Pac. 127, 130 
( 1926). Plaintiff, pursuant to URCP 64D, garnisheed 
this liquidated indebtedness from defendant to Robbins, 
Inc., its judgment debtor. In view of the law and the 
facts, the Trial Court erred in refusing judgment as 
prayed. 
CONCLUSION 
In February or March, 1960, defendant became a 
stockholder in Robbins, Inc. In April, 1960, Robbins, 
Inc. purchased such stock, delivering a note to defend-
ant. The corporation, while insolvent, made payments 
in the amount of $1,900.00 pursuant to that note. The 
transaction of April, 1960, and payments made pur-
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suant tht'reto were illegal and void as against public 
poli('y. Plaintiff, as a judgment creditor of Robbins, 
Inc., has standing-through garnishment-to raise such 
illegality. and should have been granted judgment by 
the Trial Court as prayed. It is prayed on appeal that 
this Court reverse the Trial Court's decree of dismissal 
and remand with the direction to enter judgment against 
defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the sum of the 
judgment debt owing by ~obbins, Inc. to plaintiff, 
but not to exceed $1,900.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kent Shearer 
N eslen and Mock 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1003 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
